COP31, the United Nations Climate Change Conference, began today, November 9, and runs through November 20 in Antalya, Turkey, bringing together representatives from approximately 196 countries.

For the first time in the history of UN climate conferences, the COP presidency is shared between two countries: Turkey is physically hosting the event and holds the formal presidency, while Australia has assumed the role of “Chair of the Negotiations,” with exclusive authority over the drafting of negotiated texts and the selection of ministerial facilitators. However, this division between Turkey and Australia has already sparked public friction, and there are uncertainties about how any disagreements will be resolved, since the plan is to debate “until mutual satisfaction is reached.” Let’s face it, that’s a vague formula.

The official COP31 agenda revolves around four pillars: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, climate finance for developing countries, adaptation to extreme weather events (droughts, floods), and the transition to less polluting energy sources—all while maintaining the now nearly unattainable goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.

The so-called Presidency’s Action Agenda, which brings together some 500 voluntary initiatives, highlights a goal of increasing the share of electricity from just over 20% to 35% of final energy demand by 2035 (the “35×35” target), as opposed to the direct burning of fuels. The source of this energy is not specified, but it is expected to be renewable. The same agenda calls for halving the growth of global waste and reducing the energy intensity of the construction sector by at least 25%, both by 2035.
The problem with this agenda, as can be seen, is that it contains no explicit initiatives to phase out fossil fuels, instead banking on the assumption that electrification will indirectly reduce their use. Will that really happen?
Financing is likely to be, once again, the main point of tension. A report on the adaptation gap, released on the eve of the conference, estimates that even if current funding were tripled, the total available by 2035 would range from $85 billion to $120 billion per year, compared to an estimated need of $305 billion.

The issue takes on additional context with the external debt report released this week by the World Bank: the external debt of developing countries reached a record high of $9.4 trillion in 2025, with the poorest countries paying an average of 8.2% interest on new private loans, reducing the funds available for climate investment. The World Bank itself links the two issues, with a subtle jab, stating that at COP31, climate action faces a test similar to that of debt: turning commitments into results.

Brazil arrives in Antalya to “pass the baton,” but with a record to present and a gap to explain. Minister João Paulo Capobianco (MMA) has five deliverables: a 27% reduction in net emissions between 2022 and 2024 (approximately 560 million metric tons of CO₂e); the “roadmap” to end deforestation, approved by the Interministerial Committee on Climate Change on November 6, reaffirming the goal of achieving zero deforestation and reversing it by 2030; the guidelines (not the final roadmap) for the transition away from fossil fuels, approved at the last minute by the CNPE, also on November 6; the TFFF (Tropical Forest Forever Fund), with $7.8 billion in commitments and a target of $10 billion; and the Amazon Fund’s balance sheet, with R$7.8 billion invested. In addition—and very importantly—Prodes data cited by the government indicate a 71.2% decline in deforestation in the Legal Amazon and a 48.4% decline in the Cerrado between 2022 and 2026.

We can, however, expect questions directed at the government, which is promoting an energy transition agenda in Antalya while simultaneously moving forward with oil exploration in the Equatorial Margin. Other delegations and civil society organizations are likely to call the government out on this.
Given this scenario, I believe the issues that are likely to dominate the conference are (i) the gap between promised climate finance and funds actually disbursed; and (ii) climate ambition itself.
COP31 runs the risk of being remembered more for what it failed to decide than for what it did decide.